This paper deals with the Thai government's policy on refugees with a special focus on refugees from Myanmar. It is designed to give suggestions to international human rights NGOs working in the Thai-Myanmar border areas for the protection of the human rights of Myanmarese refugees. Most international human rights NGOs in this region are lobbying for the Thai government to ratify the Refugee Convention or at the very least, take active steps towards the protection of refugees under customary international law. This paper is, however, concerned by these NGOs' reliance on the ratification of the Convention as a solution to all the problems associated with refugee protection in the region. It is understandable that establishing a structured legal regime (positive law) is crucial. But, we are also in favor of the adoption of simultaneous measures, which, if successful, in the long-run will create an environment that is conducive to a law that is respected and effectively implemented. This paper concludes that irrespective of when the law on refugee protection is brought into force in Thailand, the recommended non-legal measures will go a long way in setting the stage for the law to be implemented efficiently at some point in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the Thai government's policy on refugees with a special focus on refugees from Myanmar. Thailand is an important host country in Asia granting refuge to people from neighboring countries like Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia.
Thailand has not ratified the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) of 1951 or the Protocol of 1967 though it is a member of the Executive
Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR ExcCom). 1 ExcCom is a body which develops guidelines and prescribes standards for refugee protection worldwide.
Thailand has no domestic legislation covering the treatment of refugees and the refugee status determination procedures in place are extremely weak. Despite the risk of persecution and the well-documented human rights violations committed by the government of Myanmar and its agents, the Thai government deports nearly 10,000
Myanmarese citizens a month on grounds of illegal entry. The Thai government also supplies the government of Myanmar with information on the deportees according to a formal procedure stipulated in the MOU between Thailand and Myanmar.
As far as the public opinion in Thailand is concerned, there have been different kinds of public response toward Myanmarese forced migrants, some based on their presence in Thailand and some based on their desire to be a part of the workplace. Thai entrepreneurs and business-owners have begun to welcome illegal migrant workers from Myanmar. The Thai economy has been growing since the 1980s and Thai business-owners need the large number of migrants (illegal or legal) from neighboring countries for jobs which constitute "dirty, dangerous, and difficult (3D)"
work. 11 Additionally, these entrepreneurs pay extremely low wages to such workers. 12 workers for certain jobs in specific locations, especially in the fishery sector and rubber plantations located in the southern part of Thailand.
13
The other reaction is from local Thai workers. There are increasing complaints and protests against accepting Myanmarese migrants and allowing illegal migrants to work legally in Thailand.
14 In general, local Thai workers want the government to take a tougher position against Myanmarese migrants. repeated attempts to cross the border and enter Thailand. This is reflected in an excerpt from an interview with a migrant:
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
I have nowhere else to go and I don't know where to go so I will just stay here in Mae Hong
Son. If I am caught, I will be sent back to Burma maybe. This has happened to many people.
When they are caught, they are sent back. But they just come again -over and over. Being chased by the Thai authorities is better than being chased by the Burmese military.
24
The issue that emerges is that the Thai government views Myanmarese "illegal" and "undocumented" migrants as both "a source of trouble" and "a source of cheap labor"
simultaneously.
25

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Thai government perceives the "displaced persons" entering Thailand as "problems" to be managed and contained in "temporary" camps with possibilities of repatriation in the future.
26
Since Thailand has not ratified the international refugee law or customary international law. The definitions of "displaced person," "illegal immigrants" and "refugees" are controversial and the distinction between these categories is somewhat blurred. 28 The Thai authorities refer to people who are not migrant workers and have become refugees as "phuu oppayop", "chon platthin" (displaced persons), or as "chon klumnoy"
(minority people), or as "chon klumnoy phuu raysanchaat," meaning "minority people without documents -nationality."
29
The term "phuu liiphay" (refugee) is less frequently used, and the terms "displaced persons" and "undocumented minorities" are more widely used. (1) not in possession of passport or other passport substitute document and that which is still valid or in possession of passport or other passport substitute document, but visa has not been stamped or seen by the Thai Embassy or Consulate in foreign countries or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the exception of the special case that no visa is required for certain category of alien; (2) not in possession of a means of subsistence which normally entails for entering the Kingdom; (3) entering the Kingdom for the purpose of being worker or seeking manual labor job without the use of special knowledge or technical skills or seeking other employment contravening the law governing the employment of alien; (4) having unsound mind or afflicted with any one of the diseases prescribed in the Ministerial Regulations; (5) have not been inoculated against small pox or vaccinated or complied with the medical requirements for prevention of communicable disease according to the law governing such disease and resisting the demand for medical examination by immigration medical officer; (6) having been sentenced to imprisonment by the decision of Thai Court or by legal order the judgment of the court of foreign government with the exception of petty offense or offense committed by reckless or those offenses exempted in the Ministerial Regulations; (7) having behaved in the manner that is believed to be detrimental to the society or cause disturbances to peace and security of the public or threat to national security or being fugitive wanted by a foreign government; (8) having behaved in the manner that is believed to have engaged in prostitution, girl or child; (9) being a penniless person or having no guarantee as prescribed by the Minister pursuant to Section 14; (10) being a person unauthorized to enter the Kingdom by the Minister pursuant to Section 16; (11) having been a person deported by Thai Government or foreign government or a person whose resident permit has been once revoked in the Kingdom or in foreign country or having been expelled by the competent officer at the expense of the Thai Government expect the special exemption granted by the There are many different groups of migrants along the Thai-Myanmar border. 40 The first group includes people who migrated to Thailand generations ago and possess Thai citizenship but who belong to the "minority" communities. The second group includes people who migrated to Thailand generations ago, constitute "minority" communities, but have no Thai citizenship. The third group consists of relatively recent migrants who are officially considered "displaced"
minorities from Myanmar and who are confined to refugee camps along the border. The final group consists of recent migrants who are considered "irregular." They are mostly illegal migrants who are found in thousands in Thailand today.
Different criteria and rules apply to each group along with the (at times) arbitrary distinction drawn between being a "refugee" and being an "irregular" migrant. A unifying factor among the different Myanmarese migrant groups is that most have either been compelled to migrate by dire economic circumstances, military rule, fear of persecution and being a victim of forced displacement as a result of on-going military strategies within Myanmar.
Furthermore, many irregular and undocumented migrants are hesitant to escape from their "irregular" status even if they are eligible for refugee status under the Refugee Convention, asylum or other forms of humanitarian assistance. This is because many of these illegal migrants are confined to the refugee camps near the border regions and need to travel to Bangkok where the UNHCR office is located. The illegal migrants fear arrests and deportation while walking this trip and prefer to live in the camps, instead. What is problematic here is that these forced migrants are willing to compromise on their status within the country by working on a temporary work permit for a few years. This makes them susceptible to being deported as soon as their permit expires. 
E. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
For a long time, the Thai government was reluctant to let the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) play a role in dealing with Myanmarese refugees. During the mid-1990s however, with the rapid increase in the number of Myanmarese forced migrants, the government and local authorities realized that they were unable to cope with the situation without international support. 62 In July 1998, the Thai government invited the UNHCR to play an enhanced role as an advisor to the government for the establishment of standards relating to "refugee status 59 Ibid. 
F. HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS
The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) coordinates various human rights NGOs under its auspices. The consortium aims at protecting the legal rights of the Myanmarese forced migrants and supplying relief and medical assistance to the refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar border. The refugee camps are the primary locations for assistance activities, but these NGOs also engage with displaced people outside of the camps, in the border areas. 65 They have also actively been lobbying the Thai government to ratify the Refugee Convention so that forced migrants enjoy greater protection in Thailand.
VI. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. LEGAL CULTURE IN THAILAND
This paper is concerned that the legal culture in Thailand may not be conducive to the implementation of the Refugee Convention. to be arbitrary. 66 This, combined with the apathy of government policies and resentful public opinion which is not receptive to forced migrants in Thailand, may nullify the impact of ratifying the Refugee Convention.
Government Policy
In the 1990s, before the Thaksin Shinawatra administration, the Thai government favored a more "flexible" approach with respect to Myanmar. This approach was characterized by permitting an increasing number of undocumented migrants to enter Thailand and at times putting pressure on the Myanmarese military regime by openly discussing Myanmar's internal political problems. could stand for a lot with regard to the protection of Myanmarese refugees especially since there has not been any domestic law relating to refugee protection before. This paper is, however, concerned by the magnitude of resistance that any such law may potentially face in Thailand.
Assuming for the time being that the Convention will be ratified and a domestic law will be enacted, some important changes that this paper would advocate with respect to laws dealing with refugee protection 74 are discussed below.
a. Assurance of not being deported
One of the biggest fears that refugees face is the threat of being arrested and deported.
Therefore, they choose not to avail themselves of even the limited determination procedures in place. The refugees prefer to work as illegal migrants on paltry wages than register officially. The law therefore needs to introduce a more flexible registration system to allay the refugees' fear of being deported.
b. Basic human rights of refugees
Since the refugees are wary of official procedures, many prefer not to enter the camps where they will be retained as captives. Consequently, they hide in forests or in big cities trying to obtain work for abysmally low wages to feed themselves and their families. The enormous obstacles the refugees face in setting up alternative safe homes within refugee camps or around the Thai-Myanmar border regions and the blatant violations of their human rights (right to food, water, shelter, livelihood and healthcare) appear to be created by the stringent Thai immigration law. This paper argues that a less rigorous law which gave refugees legal status and therefore rights, in as non-threatening a way as possible, may help alleviate their present conditions. 74 This refers not only to immigration laws, which may directly influence refugee protection, but also to labor legislation, which is an important cause for exploitation.
c. Labor Legislation
One of the most important reasons why Myanmarese refugees in Thailand suffer maltreatment are the existing migration management policies, which aim at maximizing the economic contributions of migrant workers. This paper maintains that a law dealing with minimum wages which includes migrant workers within the ambit of its protection will contribute towards refugees feeling of more security in Thailand. 75 There needs to be a minimum wage, assured to workers irrespective of nationality or immigration status to prevent exploitation of vulnerable sections of the population like refugees. Deprived of food, money and health services, as discussed above, many migrants are welcomed by Thai business-owners and are made to perform dirty, dangerous, and difficult work. Enforcing a minimum wage will ensure that refugees who are in desperate need of work do not get exploited by Thai business owners. one of the developed nations in the Asian region and hence an important host country. This is, however, clearly a matter influenced by the international environment and may not be a welcome suggestion although it is a crucial determining factor.
Implementation
In terms of implementation, there needs to be increased coordination and cooperation between various government agencies. There are various government institutions involved both at the policy formulation stage as well as the implementation stage. Thus, it is important to have a greater coordination and awareness of each other's actions between these agencies.
Overall, this is clearly an inverse pyramid where ratifying the Refugee Convention is at the top-most level. Followed by this is national legislation, and local refugee determination procedures.
These local determination procedures not only need to be strengthened but also accompanied by an assurance that the migrants will not be deported if they, in good faith, try to avail themselves of the benefits under the system in place. The third layer in the pyramid is comprised of the implementation agencies and the individuals within those agencies, who bring to their work environments certain attitudes and perceptions. Implementation cannot be expected to suddenly be effective since the individuals within the agencies responsible may not perceive the problem in the same way as legislators or the people working within the NGOs do. This issue is addressed in a later section of this paper.
The problem, however, is that for a law to work it needs at the very least political will, dedicated implementation agencies, and public support and cooperation. As it stands now, government policy remains undetermined and there is an immense public resistance. 76 This paper therefore proposes a bottom-up solution instead, where perhaps creating an enabling environment may help in bringing about the change in attitudes and behaviors of the implementing agencies and the general public.
There will clearly be a fair amount of resistance to laws which aim at changing behaviors and common perceptions of Thai citizens with respect to Myanmarese refugees. It is unrealistic to expect that the refugees will be welcomed with compassion and respect when a law is enacted and at the same time not be exploited as a source of cheap labour. Thus, not only an enactment of a positive law on refugees, but also the systemic reform through education of local enforcement officials and legal professionals needs to be undertaken. Such education and training can create an enabling environment 77 so that brutality can be reduced and refugees will be treated with compassion and respect.
Since no such law exists, and in this particular case, even if it existed, it is highly unlikely that it would work given the massive negative public attitude to the Myanmarese migrants, the education of the implementation agencies and local communities can be used as an instrument to achieve partially or fully one of the functions of the law in this case, i.e. predictability and norm building.
This paper recommends to international human rights NGOs that while they should continue lobbying for the laws that they wish to have in place, they should not ignore the International human rights NGOs are encouraged to shift their focus a bit, continue lobbying for the ratification of the Convention and domestic legislation and at the same time set the stage in Thai society for the law to be successfully implemented.
According to Berman and Greiner, the law has four functions: 1) Dispute Resolution, 2)
Certainty or Predictability, 3) Education (to mold and remold the moral and legal conceptions), and 4) Establishing and Protecting Rights. 78 This theory envisages formal law as an essential prerequisite for these functions to be performed. Given that in the current situation there is no positive law which can be expected to perform such functions this paper is looking at alternative entities non-legal which can be used to perform the functions of the law.
a. Radio
The radio as a means of public communication can be used by NGOs working in the region to communicate important information in a non-threatening way to Thai citizens, people in the refugee camps and migrants in hiding. The radio can be an effective means of providing information and a certain amount of certainty or predictability to refugees with regard to how they will be protected. This paper contends that the radio is a more widely accessible means of communication, especially to those in hiding in villages or camps, and that integrating popular culture with information dissemination can prove a helpful tool since it is presented in a nonthreatening and non-invasive manner. Interestingly the impact of religion can also be gauged from the fact that Thai civil servants routinely take sabbaticals and join the 'monk-hood'. 80 The significance of this system has been demonstrated earlier with literacy rates. Before
Thailand introduced universal education, the high literacy rates were always attributed to the temple education system. 81 the Thai Constitution, the king must be a Buddhist and is the upholder of the religion. One reason for Buddhism's widespread influence is that almost all Thai families send at least one male member to a temple to study Buddha's teachings. This has been a custom for Buddhist males over 21 in Thailand for centuries. 83 Religion is clearly a semi-autonomous social field here and not only exercises an enormous amount of influence on the public but performs the educative function of law. 83 
VII. CONCLUSION
Ibid.
This paper has suggested that the fundamental problem of Myanmarese refugees and displaced persons in Thailand is that the Thai legal system does not afford them the opportunity to seek legal refuge and set up an alternative home or work without being exploited. International human rights NGOs have consistently maintained that their concern is the basic human rights of these refugees and how the fear of deportation, lack of documentation and willingness to work for pitifully low wages contribute to exploitation and inhuman treatment.
Myanmarese refugees and displaced persons, who are not in camps, are literally living in jungle hideouts or in detention centers, or in the squalor of big-city slums surviving on a day-to-day basis away from the scrutiny of Thai authorities.
This paper is concerned about the international human rights NGOs' complete faith in the ratification of the Refugee Convention as a solution to the above discussed problems. The law in this case was initially regarded as the panacea to all problems and the fact that external factors such as political will and government policy, both domestic and foreign, can influence the decision to ratify an international instrument, were ignored. This paper is not willing to totally disregard the law and accepts that establishing such a structured legal regime is crucial. It is, however, also in favor of the adoption of simultaneous measures, which, if successful, in the long-run will create an environment that is conducive to a law that is respected and effectively implemented.
This paper concludes that irrespective of when the law on refugee protection is brought into force in Thailand, the recommended non-legal measures will go a long way in setting the stage for the law to be implemented efficiently at some point in the future.
